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The Director of Central Intelligence.

Washington, D. C. 20505

27 October 1978

Executive Registry

IC 78-5458

78-3320/1


MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, USN (Ret.)
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: ASAT Arms Control Paper

REFERENCE: Memorandum to DCI from Deputy Under Secretary
for Policy, Same Subject, dtd 20 September 1978

25X1 1. Your comments on the subject paper have been received and forwarded to [] for use in updating the paper. [] advises me that the Intelligence Community ASAT Monitoring Working Group is developing a near-term update to the paper that should be available later this month. This update will, to the extent possible at this time, respond to your comments as well as those of the other members of the Interagency ASAT Treaty Working Group.

2. We have also initiated a longer term study of our capability to monitor ASAT treaty provisions. This study is scheduled for completion during the first half of CY 79.


STANSFIELD TURNER

MORI/CDF

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
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24 OCT 1978

IC 78-5457

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

SUBJECT: ASAT Arms Control Paper

REFERENCES: A. Summary of Conclusions of 15 February SCC Meeting
on the ASAT Treaty, 7 March 1978

B. Monitoring a Comprehensive ASAT Arm Control Agreement;
New Systems and Procedures for Improvement of Monitoring,
26 May 1978, [REDACTED]

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C. Memorandum to DCI from Deputy Under Secretary for
Policy, ASAT Arms Control Paper, 26 September 1978

1. Action Requested: That you sign the attached memo to the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

2. Background:

a. On 26 May, we responded to the Special Coordinating
Committee's 15 February tasking (Reference A) by distributing
Reference B. We cautioned that, "Because of the time restrictions,
the judgments reached must be considered as preliminary." The
report was prepared by an ad hoc working group chaired by the IC
Staff and consisting of representatives of CIA/NFAC, DIA, State/INR,
NSA, and the intelligence components of Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Reference B extended and supplemented an earlier report on monitoring
an ASAT agreement and was needed to provide background for developing
the U.S. position on terms of an ASAT treaty.

b. On 1 June 1978, the SCC met to consider the ASAT issue
with yourself and Sayre Stevens in attendance. As I understand it,
there was a lively discussion of the near-term strategy for the
initial meeting with the Soviets but the monitoring issue, an
important factor in our longer-term strategy, was not really discussed.

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SUBJECT: ASAT Arms Control Paper

c. The initial meeting with the Soviets was held in Helsinki in June. The Soviets appeared to be receptive toward a "hostile acts" agreement--i.e., some type of a mutual agreement on non-interference--but were not prepared to discuss anything like a comprehensive ban or a ban on testing in space.

3. Discussion:

a. We are now preparing for a second round of talks tentatively scheduled for early December and an SCC meeting on this subject has been tentatively scheduled for 3 November. In preparing for the SCC meeting, the members of the Interagency ASAT Working Group were asked to provide comments on Reference B. These comments, including a draft copy of Admiral Murphy's comments, (Reference C) have been available to us for some time. The Intelligence Community ad hoc working group has met and developed responses to most of the comments; however, some of the questions require new research and cannot be answered at this time. The working group is now preparing an updated version of the May report with a coordination draft scheduled for distribution on 27 October.

b. The Intelligence Community ad hoc working group, under NFAC leadership, has also initiated a long-term, in-depth study of ASAT monitoring. This study is scheduled for completion during the first half of CY 1979.

c. Admiral Murphy's major point is that the May report "focuses only upon the technical aspects of monitoring and the mechanics of collection. It is important that we go further, and cast the monitoring situation in the context of how our limitations would actually affect U.S. security in the event of a Soviet violation. ...Monitoring judgments should then be made in the context of the timeliness needed for the Soviets to gain a viable operational military capability,..." I agree that "the report does not substantiate that warning can be achieved sufficiently early in a breakout cycle to permit a meaningful U.S. response." However, we will be unable to respond directly to this point in the next version of the report for the following reasons:

--A full evaluation of how our monitoring limitations would actually affect U.S. security is an inappropriate subject for the Intelligence Community to address by itself.

--The subject of achievable warning in a breakout cycle was treated in a preliminary fashion in the first ASAT Monitoring paper (fall 1977). The working group feels that this topic should be referred to the longer-term study effort for an in-depth treatment.

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d. In presenting the updated version of the May report to the SCC, it will be important for you to point out the limitation relative to the treatment of warning time and explain that it is now the subject of in-depth study. The report will also be modified to highlight this particular limitation in scope.

3. Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum to Admiral Murphy.



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Attachment:
Memo to Deputy Under Secretary
for Policy

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